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Rawls and Kant: On the Primacy of the Practical 
Christine M. Korsgaard, Harvard 
 
Our task today is to talk about Rawls's influence on Kant 
scholarship. Influence of this kind can be either methodological--an 
influence on the way we approach the subject--or substantive--an influence 
on the way we interpret the content of the view. Since I believe that Rawls 
has influenced Kant scholarship in both of these ways, I shall have 
something to say about each. But having said that, let me add a disclaimer: 
these two kinds of influence are less easy to distinguish than one might 
think, especially on the conception of the subject which I am about to 
describe. 
Let me start with the methodological point. In Rawls's classes his 
students were exposed to an attitude towards the history of philosophy, 
and especially the great figures of the philosophical tradition, that I know I 
was not alone in finding exhilarating. I can best characterize this attitude 
by contrasting it with another. It is still common in some circles to make a 
rather strict separation between "doing philosophy" and "doing the history 
of philosophy." According to the view that these two activities are clearly 
distinct, which I will call "the strict separation view," when you study a 
great philosopher historically, your aim is to reconstruct the philosopher 's 
position as exactly as possible, or, if it developed and changed over time, to 
chart these changes as accurately as you can. The enterprise is conceived 
as a scholarly one, and, in a certain way, the philosopher's view is 
conceived as having frozen or solidified on the day when he died, and, to that extent, as having died with him. By that I mean that a dead 
philosopher's views are treated as a theory, a certain body of doctrine 
organized in a logical way, with some of the doctrines derived from or 
dependent upon others, and tensions and inconsistencies noted now only 
as blemishes in the final product. It is possible instead to see a dead 
philosopher 's views, as I think we do see a living one's, as something more 
like a project or even a method, a way of approaching the apparently 
intractable questions of the subject. Doctrines are of course involved in a 
project or a method, but a method is not merely a set of doctrines. What I 
have in mind here is not simply that the philosopher's doctrines might be 
applied to the problems, as when one tries to work out whether something 
is right or wrong by applying the categorical imperative. Later I will try to 
describe what I think is involved in treating a philosophical problem in a 
distinctively Kantian way, but I am sure you all recognize some ways of 
proceeding as meeting this description. Confronted with an apparent 
dilemma, for instance, we might ask: if we suppose Kant is correct in 
thinking that we view ourselves from two standpoints, might that shed 
light on why this dilemma exists? Or might the dilemma perhaps be recast 
as a sort of antinomy, with the existence of the two standpoints coming in 
as a solution? And where the philosopher is, like Kant, a deeply systematic 
philosopher , treating his work  as a method will also involve comparing 
similar problems which arise in different realms. For instance we might 
say: Kant thinks that there are deep problems about the unity of the 
thinker as such, which are resolved in such-and-such a way: here is a 
problem about the unity of the agent as such, so perhaps it is parallel, and 
perhaps a parallel solution can be found. 3	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When we think of a philosopher's views in this way, they become 
something living, and, to put the point a bit bluntly, usable. Kant generated 
a system that was not only a set of doctrines but a method, and used it to 
work through a certain range of problems; you study the system by 
retracing his tracks until you get the hang of the way he did things, and 
then you can keep going on in something like the same way yourself, 
sometimes into territory he never got near. One difference this makes is 
worth noting. Proponents of the strict separation view tend to make a lot of 
the distinction between what is "Kant's view" and what is merely a 
"Kantian view." The rough idea is that "Kant's view" is what he said or what 
follows logically from what he said, while a merely "Kantian view" involves 
a revision of one or more of the fundamental premises of his theory. When 
you look at a philosopher's work in the way I've been trying to describe, 
this distinction tends to blur almost into nonexistence. To the extent that a 
philosopher's work is a method, it becomes clear that using it is something 
which can be done well or badly, not only by later disciples who take it up, 
but by the person who gave it his name. So this attitude towards the 
subject can make you rather fearless about saying things like "Kant really 
didn't say what he meant here" and these kinds of remarks become 
absolutely continuous with moments in which you undertake to pronounce 
on what a Kantian view is of a question which Kant himself could never 
have thought about at all. 
  Now the other side of what I am calling the strict separation view 
concerns the way in which philosophers who style themselves as  "doing  
philosophy" rather than "doing history" approach and make use of history. Strict separationists who think of themselves as "doing philosophy" tend to  
treat  historical figures merely as having given their names to positions 
which are thought of in the most nakedly schematic ways. The artificially 
sharp distinction between "Kant's views" and "Kantian views" comes in 
here too, and I think in a rather pernicious way, for it is used to excuse 
some rather violent historical distortions. There are still people around 
who will refer to a contemporary philosopher as "Kantian" simply on the 
grounds that he deploys a universalizability principle. The contemporary 
philosopher may think that the only valuable thing in the world is 
agreeable experience; and freedom, culture, and respect for humanity may 
play at most a derivative role in his thought; but no matter: he thinks we 
should ask "what if everybody did that?" and so he is a "Kantian." Strict 
separationists think of the history of philosophy as a kind of warehouse of 
such schematic positions, which can simply be removed from their original 
contexts the way an object packed  away  in  a box  can be  removed  from  
its styrofoam packing pieces. You can just blow off the dust and put the 
thing in a new place. 
  Now I think that the view of a great philosopher's work as a method 
for solving philosophical problems does not license this kind of distortion. 
Especially when the philosopher is as systematic as Kant, you work in the 
awareness that a change or an addition in one place may redound 
throughout the system, and isn't to be undertaken lightly. And you also 
work in the awareness that the original author of the system probably said 
a great deal of what he said for reasons traceable to the systematic 
features of his work, and that you had better be aware of those reasons 
when you tinker with it. Sometimes I am tempted to think of a 5	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philosophical system as a kind of complex and intricately structured 
machine, like an engine. You can use it on problems that  its originator  
didn't use it on, and you might occasionally revise it to make it work better, 
but if you are going to do this sort of thing well, you had better make 
yourself an absolute master of the original schematics, and have a good 
understanding  of how  the parts all work together, or you are likely just to 
break it. And this means that studying a great figure in the history of 
philosophy with a view to the solution of contemporary problems is not 
only consistent with, but  absolutely requires, an attention to the text 
every bit as reverent as that called for by the most scholarly of 
enterprises. 
Now I don't mean to say that John Rawls ever announced this as 
exactly his view of how one might proceed to learn from the history of 
philosophy, and I don't even know to what extent he would agree with the 
things I'm saying. But in his courses in the history of moral philosophy, 
Rawls always started by saying: "We are not going to criticize these 
thinkers, but rather to interpret their positions in ways that make the best 
of them, and to see what we can learn from them." And I think what he 
wanted us to see is the connection between the two sides of that formula--
that it is by making the best of a philosopher 's position that you can learn 
the most from it. The attitude shows in Rawls's own work, although it is 
more explicit in his earlier papers, which contain lengthy footnotes 
remarking on the ways in which Hume, Kant, Mill, and Sidgwick treated 
the issues with which he is concerned. Looking at these footnotes makes it 
perfectly clear that Rawls learned a lot of what he knows about these 
questions by thinking hard about what his predecessors knew. And what I take to be a flat undeniable fact--namely, that Rawls gets somewhere with 
the philosophical problems which he undertakes to solve--is bound to 
recommend his methods to the rest of us. And it has. 
  So much for the more general methodological point. I now want to 
take up my more substantive point.  I want to  suggest  that  both  Kant  
and  Rawls  see philosophy as being, in a very deep way, a practical subject. 
I'm going to try to explain, and then illustrate, what I mean by this claim. 
  Philosophers who conceive the subject theoretically 
characteristically suppose that philosophical problems arise from gaps or 
unclarities in our theories--from something we don't know. Although it 
never happens exactly this way, such philosophers aspire to solve these 
problems by arguing from something like unassailable premises, and by 
showing that something else connected to these premises may be 
established--either as their logical consequence, or as their most natural 
interpretation, or as the best explanation for them. The philosopher 's 
proposal is supposed to win the reader's assent by showing her first that 
the premises really are unassailable, and then that this commits her to the 
rest of the philosopher 's view. 
Philosophy conceived practically by contrast takes its start not 
from a premise but from a plight. Philosophical problems are seen to arise 
not from a gap in our theoretical views but from a problematic position in 
which we find ourselves. The philosopher's job is to describe that position 
and the problem to which it gives rise in a way that enables the reader to 
recognize it as her own problem, and he wins the reader's assent by 
exhibiting his proposal as the best or the only solution to it. The method is 
not unique to Kant and Rawls. Hobbes works this way in the Leviathan, 7	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and Descartes in the Meditations. But it is particularly central to the work 
of Kant and Rawls. 
I say that it is particularly central to the work of Kant, because I 
think that this approach is actually called for by the correct interpretation 
of Kant's doctrine of the two standpoints. As I understand that doctrine, it 
goes like this: In one sense the world is given to us, it appears to us, and we 
are passive in the face of it. We must therefore think of the world as 
generating the appearances, as giving them to us. The world insofar as it 
appears to us is phenomenal; the world insofar as it actively generates the 
appearances is noumenal. We can only know the world as phenomenal, 
that is, insofar as it is given to sense, but we can think of it as noumenal. So 
there are not "two worlds," but rather one world which must be conceived 
in two different ways. And all of these points apply above all to ourselves. 
When we view ourselves as phenomena, we regard everything about 
ourselves, including inner appearances such as thoughts and choices, as 
parts of the natural world, and therefore as governed by causal laws. But 
insofar as we are rational, we also regard ourselves as active beings, who 
are the authors of our thoughts and choices, and therefore as noumena. We 
do not regard our thoughts and choices merely as things that happen in us; 
rather, thinking and choosing are things that we do. And from this 
standpoint, we can recognize laws that govern our mental powers in a 
different way than the laws of nature do: laws for the employment, for the 
use, of these powers;  laws that show us how thinking and choosing must 
be done.1 
  There may be problems with this way of looking at the human 
situation, although I don't think it commits us to a belief in any mysterious form of supersensuous existence. It does, however, have important 
implications for the way that we approach philosophical problems. It 
means that what we are seeking in philosophy is fundamental laws for the 
employment of our mental powers, laws to guide our proceedings, not laws 
whose primary aim is to explain some realm of phenomena. The basic task 
of moral philosophy, for Kant, is to answer the question "What should I 
do?" This task is set for us by our practically rational nature, which brings 
with it both the capacity for and the necessity of choosing our actions. 
Choice is our plight, our inescapable fate, as rational beings. The project of 
the critical moral philosophy is to determine what resources we can find in 
reason for solving the problem which reason itself has set for us. 
  With this as background, I want to compare two central arguments 
in the work of Kant and Rawls. Consider the opening argument of the third 
section of the Groundwork.2 It is the announcement of a problem. Kant 
begins by defining a free will as a rational causality which is effective 
without being determined by any alien cause. Anything outside of the will 
counts as an alien cause, including the desires and inclinations of the 
person. The free will must be entirely self­determining. Yet, because the 
will is a cause, it must act according to some law or other: a lawless cause 
is a kind of contradiction. Alternatively, we may say that since the will is 
practical reason, it cannot be conceived as acting and choosing for no 
reason. Since reasons are derived from principles, the free will must have 
a principle. But because the will is free, no law or principle can be imposed 
on it from outside. Kant concludes that the will must be autonomous: that 
is, it must have its own law or principle. But now we seem to have a prob­ 
lem: for where is this law to come from? If it is imposed on the will from 9	 ﾠ
outside then the will is not free. So the will must make the law for itself. 
But until the will has a law or a principle, there is nothing from which it 
can derive a reason. So how can it have any reason for making one law 
rather than another? And indeed the problem is in a way even worse than 
that. For it looks as if the free will, by imposing some law or principle upon 
itself, must restrict its own freedom in some arbitrary way. 
Now the problem which Rawls confronts is almost exactly like this. 
Political philosophers have long been aware that there is a kind of paradox 
at the very heart of liberalism . The problem emerges most starkly if you 
imagine someone trying to argue in favor of instituting a liberal regime in a 
nation whose culture and beliefs are not liberal. Imagine a nation in which 
there is a state religion which people must practice. This religion leads to 
illiberal policies: it assigns a subordinate role to women, say, or involves a 
caste system. It is, however, accepted by the population. Anyone who 
wanted to argue that more liberal political policies should be instituted in 
this society would face an intractable problem, for it is an essential tenet of 
liberalism that the government should be acceptable in the eyes of its 
people. If liberalism is the doctrine that you can't push people around in 
the name of what you think is right, then liberals themselves are 
committed to the view that they can't push people around in the name 
of the doctrine that you can't push people around in the name of what you 
think is right. To put the point more simply, we cannot tyrannize over 
others in the name of liberalism and still be consistent liberals. By its own 
criterion, a liberal state must be acceptable in the eyes of its citizens. So no 
matter how passionately one was convinced that a liberal regime is the 
best one or the right one for human beings to live under, one could not consistently take that as a reason for forcing a liberal regime on an 
unwilling population. 
Now Rawls is not, in this sense, trying to justify the liberal state. 
That is, he is not trying to give arguments that would show that there are  
grounds  for forcing a liberal state on an unwilling population. But he is 
concerned about a parallel problem which arises when we try to justify 
policies within the liberal state, for even within the liberal state, we must 
use the coercive mechanisms of the state to enforce liberal policies. Since 
liberalism claims that political institutions and policies are justified when 
they are acceptable in the eyes of the citizens, we must be able to offer 
reasons in support of these coercive policies which are acceptable to all the 
citizens. To illustrate: suppose a society contains a majority and a minority 
religion, and suppose the majority wish to get their church accepted as the 
official state church. What reasons can they offer for this? They might say 
"Our religion should be the state religion, because our religion is the one 
true faith." This is not a reason that the minority can reasonably be 
expected to accept, since of course they don't think so. So in a liberal 
society, this will not be accepted as a good reason for coercive action. 
  Of course the majority are not just going to insist that they are right: 
they have certain arguments for their view--metaphysical, theological, and 
historical arguments--and they can marshal these and try to convince the 
minority that they are right. But the minority also have these kinds of 
arguments, and we may suppose that when all is said and done the 
disagreement remains. In a modem society, people hold different 
philosophical, theological, and metaphysical doctrines, which are 
reasonable in the sense that they need not involve the kind of obvious 11	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error or craziness that entitles us to regard people as mentally defective or 
emotionally deranged. These doctrines can be backed by arguments, but 
these arguments do not convince everybody or settle the question.3 In the 
face of this fact it is inconsistent with liberalism to justify political policy 
on metaphysical or theological grounds, since such grounds may not be 
acceptable to all. 
  So now suppose that the majority say "Look, we want to use the 
coercive mechanisms of the state to ensure that everyone's soul is saved. 
Nothing is more important than that. Why shouldn't we be allowed to do 
this?" We cannot now turn around and justify liberal policies themselves 
on controversial metaphysical or philosophical grounds. For instance, we 
cannot consistently justify liberty of conscience by appeal to a 
controversial philosophical theory that says that there just are certain  
inalienable human  rights,  and  liberty  of conscience  is one of them ; or by 
appeal to Kant's theory that autonomy is the supreme moral value; or by 
appeal to Mill's arguments for the utilitarian value of open discussion and 
experimental living. These may be excellent reasons for believing in liberty 
of conscience, if they are true; but they are controversial, and so they do 
not meet the criterion of being acceptable in the eyes of everyone. Our 
argument for liberty of conscience must itself be one that everyone can 
accept, if it is to justify the liberal policy in a liberal way. But this seems to 
leave us at a loss. How are we to make an argument which everyone 
accepts, in a society where there is apparently nothing that everyone 
accepts? 4 
These two problems, Kant's and Rawls's, have the same structure. 
What we are looking for are principles themselves, for we need reasons, ways of justifying our actions or our policies, and reasons are derived from 
principles. Yet the very structure of the situation seems to forbid us to 
choose any particular principles. The liberal's need to maintain neutrality 
among various competing conceptions of the good exactly matches the free 
will's need to maintain its own freedom. In each case, it looks as if the 
choice of any given principle must be arbitrary. In Rawls's construction of 
his problem, it looks as if the choice of any particular principle of justice 
must be based on an arbitrary preference for one conception of the good 
over others; in Kant's, it looks as if the choice of any principle of volition 
must involve an arbitrary restriction of the will's spontaneity. And the 
solutions proposed by Kant and Rawls take an exactly parallel form. 
  Kant's solution goes like this: The categorical imperative, as 
represented by the Formula of Universal Law, tells us to act only on a 
maxim which we could will to be a law. And this, according to Kant, is the 
law of a free will. To see why, we need only compare the problem faced by 
the free will with the content of the categorical imperative. The problem 
faced by the free will is this: the will must have a law, but because the will 
is free, it must be its own law. And nothing determines what that law must 
be. All that it has to be is a law. Now consider the content of the categorical 
imperative, as represented by the Formula of Universal Law. The 
categorical imperative merely tells us to choose a law. Its only constraint 
on our choice is that it have the form of a law. And nothing determines 
what that law must be. All that it has to be is a law. Kant concludes that the 
categorical imperative just is the law of a free will. It does not impose any 
external constraint on the free will's activities, but simply arises from the 
nature of the will. It describes what a free will must do in order to be what 13	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it is. It must choose a maxim it can regard as a law.5 
  Rawls's solution to his problem may be put in almost parallel terms. 
Rawls 's two principles of justice tell us that all citizens must have equal 
basic liberties, and that our society must otherwise be designed so that it is 
to the benefit of everyone.6 And these, Rawls might say, just are the 
principles of justice for a liberal society. To see why, we need only compare 
the problem faced by the parties in the original position--those who are to 
choose the principles of justice-- with the content of the two principles.7 
Echoing Rousseau, we might say that the problem faced in the original 
position is this: to find a conception of justice which enables every member 
of society to pursue her conception of the good as effectively as possible, 
while leaving each member as free as she was before.8 The content of 
Rawls's two principles simply reflect this conception of the problem. So 
they describe what a liberal society must do in order to be what it is. We 
arrive at the principles of justice for a liberal society by thinking about the 
problem faced by a liberal society, just as we arrive at the categorical 
imperative by thinking about the problem faced by a free will. In each case, 
in fact, a sufficiently detailed and accurate description of the problem 
yields its solution.  
  There are other points in common between the two arguments 
which I have just sketched. Both begin, although for rather different 
reasons, from the realization that we are in territory where theoretical 
metaphysics cannot help us. This is not just because we haven't got it, but 
because the problems we face, the problems we have to solve, are in any 
case practical rather than theoretical. Kant's view, as I understand it, is 
not just that we cannot have metaphysical knowledge about whether there are free wills, or what they would do if they existed. Even if we did, that 
wouldn't solve the problem posed by the fact that we must act under the 
idea of freedom, since what we must decide is what to do. And in Rawls's 
liberal state, we can't appeal to our metaphysical convictions about justice 
even if we have them, since the problem is posed by the legitimacy of 
disagreement about exactly such conceptions. Since the problems are 
practical, the solutions must be practical as well. And in constructing these 
solutions, both philosophers deploy practical conceptions of the person: as 
free to choose her own ends and reasons, in Kant's case, and as rational 
(that is, able to formulate, revise, and intelligently pursue a conception of 
the good) and reasonable (able to cooperate with others whose conceptions 
may be different) in Rawls's case.9 This is not because these are the known 
metaphysical facts about persons, but rather because these conceptions of 
the person are in a sense foisted upon us by the problems we face. For 
Kant, the necessity of acting under the idea of freedom is a fundamental 
feature of the plight of reason; without that necessity, the problem of 
morality would not arise. For Rawls, in the same way, rationality and 
reasonableness are fundamental attributes of persons conceived as 
citizens of a liberal society, for unless people had both conceptions of the 
good they wished to pursue, and an ability to cooperate with those who 
have different conceptions, the problem posed by liberal society could not 
arise. In this way, both Kant and Rawls tackle problems conceived in a 
practical way by constructing a realm of practical concepts and 
arguments. In my view, both the reinterpretation of Kant's ideas in these 
terms, and, following Rawls, new employments of this method of solving 
philosophical problems, are projects worthy of further work . 15	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Notes 
 
1. Evidence for this interpretation of the two standpoints doctrine may be  
found in the Third Section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals, especially pp. 451-452. There Kant argues that "even the 
commonest understanding" distinguishes appearances from things in 
themselves as a result of observing the difference between representations 
in the face of which we are passive and those in which we show our own 
activity. He then argues that we place ourselves among the things in 
themselves because of the pure spontaneity of reason, which in its 
production of ideas involves no element of passivity at all. The claim is 
clearly that we regard ourselves as things in themselves insofar as we are 
active. It is immediately after these remarks that Kant says that "a 
rational being...has two standpoints from which he can regard himself and 
know the laws of the employment of his powers...." (p. 452; my emphasis). 
The page numbers here are those of the Prussian Academy Edition (Kants 
gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Company, 1902-. ) 
found in the margins of most translations. 
2. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 446-447. 
3. In Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 
Rawls calls this "the fact of reasonable pluralism." See p. 24n., 36ff. 
4. This problem is much more clearly in focus in Political Liberalism than it 
was in Rawls's earlier book, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971), and the modifications  in the way Rawls presents 
his view in the later work are largely due to his increased appreciation of its depth and difficulty. Nevertheless, as I am about to argue and as Rawls 
himself believes, the strategy of the argument in A Theory of Justice does 
provide for its solution. 
5. I defend this interpretation of Kant's solution at  greater length in my 
essay "Morality as Freedom," in Yirmiyahu Yovel, ed., Kant's Practical 
Philosophy Reconsidered (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989); 
which is also Chapter 6 in Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
6. This is a deliberately general statement of Rawls's two principles, which 
he states with increasing specificity as he develops his view. For more 
exact formulations, see A Theory of Justice, pp. 302-303 and Political 
Liberalism, pp. 5 and 271. 
7. For the idea of constructing a solution from the "original position" see A 
Theory of Justice, pp. 17-22, and Political Liberalism, pp. 22-28. 
8. Rousseau says that the problem solved by the social contract is to "Find 
a form of association which defends and protects with all common forces 
the person and the goods of each associate, and by means of which each 
one, while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as 
free as before." Quoted from p. 148 of On The Social Contract in Donald A. 
Cress, trans., The Basic Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,  1987). 
9. See Political Liberalism, pp. 48-54.  